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WHY  DO  FARMERS  FORWARD  CONTRACT  IN FACTOR
MARKETS?
John J. Haydu, Robert J. Myers, and Stanley R. Thompson
Abstract  inputs, and little is currently  known about the eco-
This study investigated  farmers' incentive to for-  nomic incentives for this behavior.  Is it to manage
ward purchase inputs.  A model  of farmer decision  price risk, to ensure timely  delivery of supplies, or
making was used to derive an optimal forward con-  to guarantee consistent quality?  Forward contract-
tracting rule. Explicit in the model was the tradeoff  ing inputs could facilitate the planning process and
between  the  quantity  of input  to be  purchased  in  allow  farmers to diversify purchases  over time.  A between the quantity  of input  to be  purchased  in
advance, and the remaining portion to be purchased  fundamental  step  necessary  to  the  better  under-
later on the spot market.  Results indicated  that the  standing of forward  purchase transactions  is to ex-
primary reasons farmers contract inputs are to reduce  amine the potential  gains  from a buyer's  point of
view. Specifically, what is the underlying incentive risk and to speculate on favorable price  moves.  A  Specifically,  what is the underlying  incentive
numerical example of fertilizer used in corn produc-  which entices some farmers to engage in the practice
tion indicated that the size of the price discount was  of forward contracting in factor markets?
the  dominant  factor  in forward  contracting  deci-  This paper investigates  the incentive issue by  in-
sions.  corporating the forward contracting of inputs into a
model  of farmer  decision  making.  Explicit  in the
Key words:  forward contract, decision making,  model is the tradeoff between the quantity of input
price discount, risk aversion  to be purchased in advance (prior to when inputs are
actually  allocated)  at  the  forward  price,  and  the
I/ost research  on responses  to  agricultural pro-  remaining portion to be purchased subsequently  on
duction risk has focused  on  the output side of the  the spot market.  A numerical  example of forward
production  process,  particularly  when considering  contracting fertilizer used in corn production is used
forward and futures contracts (e.g., McKinnon 1967;  to  illustrate the model.  The optimal  forward  con-
Chavas  and  Pope  1982;  Anderson  and  Danthine  tracting  decision  is  characterized  in terms  of the
1983). Some attention has been given to the impact  probability distribution of corn and fertilizer prices,
of risk on factors of production.  For instance, Batra  as well as other relevant parameters.
and Ullah (1974) show how introducing output price
risk into a certainty  model  alters  output levels but  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In
leaves relative input quantities unchanged.  Robison  the next section,  a description  of the forward con-
and Barry (1987)  evaluate input demand under four  tracting  problem  facing  farmers  is  presented.  Of
conditions:  output price risk; input price risk; input  major concern are the decisions facing contract par-
quality risk; and production function risk. They also  ticipants, the economic  incentives  that underlie the
introduce  flexibility by allowing  the firm to select  agreement, and the possible tradeoffs involved when
one input after the uncertainty is resolved (see also  operating  in  a risky  environment.  The  following
Hartman  1975;  Holthausen  1976).  This  approach  section presents  the model and  derives  a decision
allows  the  decision  maker  to  respond  to  new  or  rule for  optimal forward contracting  of inputs.  Fi-
changing  conditions.  In each of these cases,  how-  nally, the numerical example is presented by estimat-
ever, the research has assumed  spot factor markets  ing  an optimal forward contract ratio  for fertilizer
only,  with  no  forward  contracting  of inputs.  But  used in corn production.  The optimal  ratio is com-
many  farmers  forward purchase  a portion of their  puted  over a range of different parameter values in
1  An environment  is considered risky when it consists of various uncertain events whose outcomes may alter the decision
maker's well-being.
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145order to illustrate key points about the forward con-  when the forward contracting decision is made. This
tracting decision.  is an oversimplification for most actual agricultural
production processes  which have stochastic yields
EXCHANGE IN FORWARD  CONTRACTS  and which allow adjustment of input levels at various
FOR INPUTS  points throughout the process.  However, the model
Forward contracting for inputs is a practice which  can be thought of as the second stage of a two-stage
is usually initiated by the manufacturer. The manu-  decision process, in which the optimal level of total
facturer's  primary  incentive  to  forward  sell  is  to  input  allocations  is  chosen  first  and  the  optimal
improve the firm's planning capacity. There are sub-  proportion of total requirements to forward contract
stantial risks surrounding some input markets, par-  is chosen second. Furthermore,  the fixed output as-
ticularly  regarding  future  prices  and demand.  By  sumption leads to a simple forward contracting  de-
establishing a portion of future demand in a forward  cision  rule which is straightforward  to derive and
market, the manufacturer  is able to plan for a mini-  analyze. Thus, the model provides a useful first step
mum production level and cover variable costs.  in analyzing forward contracting in factor markets.
Farmers participate in forward contracting  inputs  Multiple inputs can be included in the model without
because  it  allows  them  to  lock  in  a  certain  price  changing  any of the main results provided that for-
earlier  than would  be possible  otherwise,  and be-  ward contracts  exist for only one of the inputs, and
cause it reduces  risks surrounding  the quality  and  the technology  is characterized  by a Leontief fixed
timeliness of input deliveries. However, these incen-  proportions production function.
tives may not be enough to induce entry into forward  The farmer is subject to a pair of  budget constraints
contracts.  Farmers  generally  also  require  a  price  which define terminal wealth after output has been
discount to encourage widespread participation.  realized. These constraints can be expressed as:
The equilibrium forward contract price is largely a
function  of  manufacturing  costs,  current  input  (1)  Wt  = (1 + r)  [ W -f,  b]
prices, expected future input prices, and the prefer-  (2)  WT =  PTYT + ( 1 + rt)  [W  - w, ( x, - b  ) ]
ences of farmers and input manufacturers.  Although
contracts often vary across firms, typically  they are  where  Wr  is initial wealth; Wt is wealth at the input
of short duration (less than one year),  have a fixed  allocation  period t; WTis  terminal wealth;  rT  is the
price, and may require substantial advance payment.  interest  rate between  and  t;  r  is the interest  rate
This financial commitment by the farmer is usually  between  and T; bis theamount oftheinput forward
compensated for by a price discount below the cur- 
rent spot price. A  5 to  10 percent discount is com-  crced  tis the  total  amount  of  inp
mon. Once  the contract is finalized,  an increase  in  purchased by time t;f'  is the forward contract price;
the market price implies an ex post gain to farmers  pr is the output price realized in the terminal period
whereas a price decline implies an ex post loss.  (stochastic at period T); and w,  is the spot price of the
input in the  input allocation  period  (stochastic  at
THE MODEL  period  T).  Notice that payments  for  forward  con-
Consider a three period decision environment con-  tracted inputs are made in full at the time forward
sisting of an initial period  T in which inputs can be  contracting  takes place,  while payments  for inputs
forward  contracted;  an  intermediate  period  t in  purchased  on  the spot market  are  not  made  until
which inputs are allocated to the production process;  period t Ofcoursenopaymentisreceivedforoutput
and a terminal period Tin which output is realized.  until production is realized in period T
The farmer can forward contract all  input require-  The  farmer's  objective  is  to  choose the amount
forward contracted to maximize the expected utility
ments in period T if he or she chooses, or choose not  forward contracted to maxiize the expected utility
of terminal wealth, conditional on information avail-
to forward contract so that all input requirements are 
purchased  on the spot market at period t. Altema-  able at time
tively, the farmer  may choose  to forward contract
some proportion of his or her requirements at T and  (3)  max E  [ U(WT) ]
purchase the remainder on the spot market  at t. The  b,
rest of this section characterizes a model of how this
decision can be made optimally.  where  U is an increasing  and strictly concave  von
The farmer is assumed  to be producing  a known  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility function; and ET indi-
fixed level of output,  yT, using a single input. Thus,  cates expectation  conditional  on information avail-
total input requirements, xt,  are  known in advance  able at T. The maximization is subject to the wealth
146constraints (1)  and (2) .The first-order condition for  By  dividing  through  by  x,, the optimal  forward
this problem is  contracting  rule can be expressed as a ratio of total
input requirements:
(4)  ET[U( WT)K] =
10)  a=  wp  +p  [ W  (1  + r)fT]
where K= ( 1 + r ) [ wt(  1 + rT )f,  ].  Second-or-  Xt  (1+ rt)(W  (1 + rT)RRwf
der conditions  for a maximum are satisfied by the  where a  = yr/t  is the average product of the input.
concavity of U.  We might want to constrain the forward contracting
A theorem noted by Rubinstein (1976) is useful in  decision by requiring 0 < bT  < xt (i.e. farmers cannot
analyzing  the  first-order  condition  further.  Rub-  eein-ut eiter frard or on te  t maret.
stein's theorem shows that if  (WT,  K) is multivariate  In this case we would use (10) whenever the optimal
normal, then  ratio  is between  zero  and  one but set the optimal
forward  contracting  ratio to  zero  (one)  if (10)  is
CovT [ U'( WT), K] = negative (greater than one).
ET [ U"(  WT)  ]Cov  ( WT, K).  The first term in the optimal  forward contracting
ratio (10) can be interpreted as the "hedging" or risk
Using this result, the first-order condition  can be  management  part of the decision, while the second
written  term can be interpreted as the "speculative" part. To
see  this,  let the  forward  contract  price  equal  the
ET [ U"( WT)  ]Cov, ( WT, K)  discounted expected spot price
+ E[ U' ( WT)  ]ET (K)= 0
( 1)  wt -(  + rTf, = 0.
or, evaluating  CovT ( WT,  K) and E  ( K),
In this case, there is no expected gain or loss from
A  [CF  (1  + r,) (x  - bT)  - YFT  P  + Wforward  contracting  and the forward contract  deci-
(7)  2 (1 +  rt) (  sion is aimed solely at reducing risk. This leads  to
- (1 + r0)  fT  = 0 - (1 +^ T) fT  =  0"  the pure hedging decision rule
where A  = -ET [ U" (WT)  ]/E  [ U(WT)]  is a meas-  b  a
ure of absolute risk aversion;  o2,  is the conditional  (12)  - = 1 -
variance  of  wt;  owp  is  the  conditional  covariance 
between wt and PT; and w, is the conditional  expec-
tation of wt. adT;ad  ithcodtolexc  On the other hand, if the forward contract price is
less than the discounted expected spot price,
Multiplying  the  first term  in  (7)  by  pTYT / PTYT
where  rT=  ET (PT)  does  not  change  anything  but  - + 
11  P  ~~~~~~~~(13)  wt - (1  + rt  )f)  >  0 allows (7) to be expressed as:
R [y2w  (1  + r ) (x, - bT)  - Ywp]  then the farmer will speculate by forward contracting
(8)  Y  )  more  than  (12)  in  order  to  increase  the  expected
+PTYT[Wt  - (1  + rT)f  =0  ggains  from  forward  contracting.  Similarly,  if  the
forward contract price is greater than the discounted
where  R =  APTYT.  We interpret  R as  a  measure  of  expected spot price,
relative risk aversion evaluated at a wealth level that
equals  expected gross  income from the production  (14)  ti-(1 + r)f T < 0
process. Further, below we analyze the sensitivity of
the optimal forward contracting  rule to  alternative
then the farmer will speculate by forward contracting values of this relative risk aversion measure.
oi  r  tives  ae  tiomaure  n  less than (12) in order to reduce the expected losses
Solving  (8) for b, gives the optimal forward con- 
Solvacting  (8)rule  fbgsh  pfrom  forward contracting.  In both of the latter two
~~tractm~in~g  rule  ^  ^cases,  the farmer is trading off higher expected re-
turns against increased risk.  Thus, the two primary
(9)  bT= x  YTrWP  +  PTYT [ Wt  - (1 + rT)fT ]  purposes of forward  contracting  by farmers  are to
t(19 + ^rt)&C  (1 + rt)Ro 2w  reduce  risks  and  to  speculate  on  favorable  price
moves.
147The effect of an increase in relative risk aversion is  Table  1.  Parameter Values
to diminish the size of the speculative adjustment to
the pure hedging forward contract ratio (12). That is,  Parameter  Range
as the farmer becomes more risk averse,  he or she  a  1000-1800
will revert  towards  the risk minimizing  rule  (less  r  0.10
forward contracting if  wt - (1 + r)f, > 0 and more  wt  156.26
forwarding  contracting if  t - (1 + r,)f, < 0 ). This  p  2.36
is the expected result, that speculative  activity  de-  T
creases  with  an  increase  in  risk  aversion.  If the  Pricediscount  0%-15%
expected gain from forward contracting is zero, then  R  1-3
the optimal rule is independent  of the farmer's  de-  Ow  98
gree of risk aversion.  w  0.235 Uwp  0.235
The optimal forward contract ratio depends on the
farmer's  degree of risk aversion,  the  value  of the  that the application of  115 pounds  of nitrogen per
forward  contract  price  relative  to  the  discounted  acre  could be expected to yield approximately  100
expected spot price, interest rates, the average prod-  bushels of corn. However, anhydrous ammonia con-
uct of the input, the expected output price,  and the  tains only 82 percent nitrogen, so it takes 140 pounds
covariance matrix of the output and spot input prices.  of anhydrous  ammonia  to produce  100 bushels of
In particular, if the covariance  between output and  corn.  Converting  pounds  to tons  (to  be consistent
spot  input  prices  is  positive,  then  the  larger  the  with  the pricing  units  of $/ton) gives  an average
covariance,  the less forward contracting takes place.  product of 1430. A range of 1000 to 1800 around this
The reason  is that if output and input prices move  average was used in this study in order to examine
together,  then locking in an input price via forward  the model's sensitivity to changes in this parameter.
contracting  exposes the farmer to the risk of output  The annualized  interest rate was chosen to be  10
price  declines  without  a commensurate  decline in  percent. To compute r,  and r, from this rate, the time
input prices. In this case, the farmer avoids risk by  intervals between forward contracting  and fertilizer
forward contracting less rather than more.  application,  and between  fertilizer  application and
corn harvest must be known. This study assumed that
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE  forward contracting occurs  in February,  that fertil-
As a numerical example of how to operationalize  izer is applied in May, and that harvest is in August.
the optimal forward contract ratio, the case of fertil-  Thus, assuming continuous compounding
izer used in corn production  was considered.  This
example was designed to illustrate various aspects of  (15a)  1 + rT = e025r =  1.025
the model, particularly with respect to relative risk  (15b)  + rt = e
25 = 1.025
aversion,  the average  product of the input, and the
price discount received from a forward purchase.  T 
The  expected  corn  and  spot  fertilizer  prices  min
Fertilizer  data were for anhydrous  ammonia and  Table  1 were computed  by taking a simple sample
were obtained from two different sources. Six years  mean  of the corn and spot fertilizer price  data  de-
of monthly  spot prices  ($/ton) from  1982 through  scribed earlier. The forward contract price was then
1988 were purchased from a private fertilizer infor-  calculated  by  applying a price  discount to  the ex-
mation service ("Green Markets"). These data rep- mation service  ("Green  Markets").  These data rep-  pected spot fertilizer price.  That is, if the price dis-
resented  agricultural  fertilizer prices (FOB) for the  count for forward contracting was d, then
midwest  corn  belt.  Forward  contract  price  data
($/ton) were obtained directly from a midwest fertil-
izer  manufacturer.  Finally,  monthly  corn  prices  (16)  f  =  Wt
($/bushel)  for the same seven years were  collected  (1 + d)
from midwest grain elevators.  The price discount for forward contracting used in
To operationalize the optimal forward contract ra-  the numerical example ranged between 2.5 and 2.7
tio,  estimates of all of the terms on the right-hand-  percent.
side of (10) were needed.  Table  1 gives a range of  Because  fertilizer  forward  contracted  is  usually
parameter  values over which the model was simu-  sold at a price discount, the optimal forward contract
lated. The average product of fertilizer used in corn  ratio is likely to be quite sensitive to the degree  of
production  was  calculated  based  on  results  from  farmer  risk aversion.  To  examine  this sensitivity,
Vitosh, Lucas, and Black  (1979). That study found  relative  risk aversion  ranged from R =  1 to R = 3,
148values consistent with those estimated by Friend and  Table 2.  Dickey-Fuller  Unit  Root Test Results
Blume.
The final piece of information required to simulate  t =  0 +  61Zt-1 +  82At-1 +  3AZ t-2 +  54Zt-3 +  Vt
the  forward  contracting  rule  was  the  conditional  81  t-Value  p-Value
covariance matrix of corn and spot fertilizer prices.  Fertilizer  Price  -0.0511  1.565  >.10
These parameters  were estimated  from a bivariate  Con Pri  -0.0370  1.240  >.10
time-series  model of corn and fertilizer prices using 
Note: > .10 indicates  p-value is  greater than .10 the  data described  earlier.  A time-series  approach
was  appropriate  because  the  covariance  matrix
should be conditional on information available in the
Table 3.  Estimated VAR for Corn and Spot forward contracting  period  (Myers and Thompson  Table.or
1989).  Plots  of the estimated  correlograms  of the
data suggested a strong possibility of nonstationarity  Independent  Dependent Variables
in both the corn and fertilizer price series, but that  Variables  AWt 
they were stationary after first differencing. Unit root
Constant  -0.004  -0.007 tests  developed  by  Dickey  and  Fuller  were  also  (1.12)  (1.124)  (0.020)
applied, and the null hypothesis of a unit root could
not be rejected for either series (Table 2). This indi-  I  0.4)  0.003 (0.124)  (0.002)
cated that the series were stationary after first differ-
Aot -i  -7.199  0.112 encing.  The  time-series  model  was  therefore  (7.12)  (0.129)
estimated in first difference  form. The final specifi-0.194  -0.002
aWt-  12  0.194  -0.002 cation arrived at was a bivariate vector autoregres-  (0.131)  (0.002)
sion (VAR):  aptN-  12  -2.226  0.274
(6.819)  (0.122)
(17a)  AW= Ylo+  Y 11 At-w  +  Yi 2APt-1 + Y 1 3At-1 2 Q Statistics  5.50 (6 lags)  5.81  (6  lags)
Y 14Apt-, 12 '+ t, and  of Residuals  11.75 (12 lags)  10.36 (12 lags)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
17b) Apt =  20  + Y21AWt-i + Y22Apt-i  + Y23AWt-12
+ Y 24APt-12 +  2t  The  relevant  forecast  errors  were  computed  by
generating  three  and  six month forecasts from the
where  Awt = wt - wt-1  and  Apt = p - pt-l.  The  12  VAR model and subtracting these from actual price
month  lags were  included  to account  for apparent  realizations.  The  sample  covariance  matrix  of the
seasonality  in the data. Estimation results  are pro-  errors constructed in this way was  then used as an
vided  in Table  3. Using the Box-Pierce  Q-statistic,  estimate  of the required  conditional  variance  and
the null hypothesis of white noise residuals in both  covariance, leading to the estimates in Table 1.
(17a) and (17b) could not be rejected (Table 3).  Results from simulating the model over the rele-
The covariance matrix of the one-step-ahead fore-  vant range  of parameters  are  shown in  Table 4. A
cast  errors  from  the  VAR  is  standard  regression  striking feature of the results is that forward contract
output in most  econometric  software.  Because  the  ratios were very sensitive  to the price  discount of-
data were  monthly,  however, these one-step-ahead  fered on forward contracts. If the price discount was
forecast error covariances  were not appropriate for  less than or equal  to 2.5  percent,  then the optimal
the problem  at hand.  As  discussed  earlier,  it was  forward contract  ratio  was zero  (no  forward con-
assumed that forward contracting of fertilizer occurs  tracts) over the entire range chosen for other parame-
in February, that fertilizer application occurs in May,  ters. The reason is that fertilizer prices in period 2
and that harvest is in August.  Thus, an estimate  of  and  corn prices in period  3  were positively corre-
the  covariance  matrix  of the errors  from a  three-  lated. Thus, the farmer obtained a natural hedge from
month-ahead  forecast of fertilizer prices (February-  his or her open positions by not forward contracting.
May) and a six-month-ahead  forecast of corn prices  If corn prices fell (rose), then fertilizer prices were
were needed (February-August).  This is because the  also likely  to fall (rise), thereby mitigating some of
analysis required  the variance  of the spot fertilizer  the detrimental  (beneficial) effects of the corn price
price at application  and the covariance between the  change.  This natural  hedge was  lost if the farmer
spot fertilizer price at application  and the corn price  locked in a fertilizer price via forward contracting,
at harvest, both conditional on information available  because the farmer was then fully exposed to the risk
when forward contracting takes place.  of corn price decreases (and increases). Thus, in this
149Table 4.  Optimal  Forward  Contracting  Ratios  contracted  unless  farmers  were  very  risk  averse
Under a Range of Alternative  Parameter  (relative risk aversion greater than three).  Thus, the
Values  size of the price discount is the key determinant  of
rfPrice Discount  orward contract decisions for fertilizer in this exam-
Parameter  _____ Price Discount  l
Values  2.5%  2.55%  2.6%  2.65%  2.7%
R =  1.0  CONCLUSIONS
a = 1000  0  0.45  1  1  1  Forward contracting of inputs is a growing activity
a  =  1400  0  0.23  1  1  1  between the suppliers of inputs and the farmers who
use them. From a manufacturers' viewpoint, a major
ox=1800  0  0.01  1  1  1I incentive  to  forward sell  is an  enhanced  planning
capacity.  Not  only  does  this  improve  production
efficiency,  but it also reduces  potential bottlenecks
a  =  1000  0  0  0.45  1  1  in distribution du mg peak periods of demand.  Yet
a = 1400  0  0  0.23  1  1  little is currently known about the economic incen-
a=  1800  0  0  0.01  1  1  tives  of farmers  for  participating  in this  form  of
exchange.  As with the manufacturer,  is it primarily
R =3.0  to reap the benefits of improved planning,  or is it
a= 1000  0  0  0  0.45  1  (also) to reduce price risk through diversified  pur-
chases, or to ensure reliable supplies and quality?
a  = 1400  0  0  0  0.23  1  This paper focuses on the decisions facing farmers
a  =  1800  0  0  0  0.01  1  who forward purchase inputs.  A simple model was
Note: Optimal forward contracting  ratios restricted  to lie  used to derive an optimal rule for forward contract-
between  zero and one.  ing. The optimal forward  contracting rule indicated
that the two primary reasons farmers might partici-
example,  the risk minimizing  forward contracting  pate  in  forward  contracts  are  to  reduce  risk  (the
rule was to forward contract nothing.  hedging  component) and to speculate on favorable
Changes  in the average  product  also affected  the  price moves (the speculative component).  Specula-
forward contract ratio.  For instance, an increase in  tive activity is curtailed  as farmer risk aversion in-
the average product would imply that less fertilizer  creases.  At  the  limit,  as  farmer  risk  aversion
was required for a given level of output. Therefore,  increases to infinity, the optimal forward contracting
total  fertilizer  needs  would  decline,  including  the  rule reduces  to a variance  minimizing rule,  which
need to forward contract.  depends on the average product of the input and the
At price discounts above 2.5  percent,  small fluc-  joint distribution of input and output prices.
tuations in the discount led to wild swings in forward  A numerical example of forward contracting fer-
contracting decisions. Forward contracting declined  tilizer used in corn production indicated that the size
as risk aversion increased for a given price discount.  of the price  discount  was the  dominant  factor in
This  decline occurred because  farmers  were using  forward  contracting  decisions.  With  no price  dis-
forward  contracts  to speculate  on favorable  price  count, no fertilizer was forward contracted. Further-
movements,  with more forward contracting taking  more, small changes in the price discount had large
place as the price discount increased. Increased risk  effects  on  the  amount  of fertilizer  forward  con-
aversion curbed this speculative activity and caused  tracted,  tending to swamp the effects of changes in
the forward  contracting decision  to move  towards  other  parameters  in  the model.  This  supports  the
theriskminimizing choice of  zero forward contracts.  view that price discounts, not risk aversion or hedg-
If the price discount was greater than or equal to 2.7  ing potential,  are the crucial element in the forward
percent,  then all  input requirements  were  forward  contracting market for fertilizer.
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